). We wish to thank Jordi Galí, Benoît Mojon, and participants at several seminars for their helpful feedback. We are also very grateful to Michel Juillard for his help with the Dynare code. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should under no circumstances be interpreted as reflecting those of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem. Using an estimated DSGE model with a frictional banking sector, we find that such liquidity injections can have large macroeconomic effects, with multipliers up to 0.5. However, the latter depend in an important way on how standard monetary policy is adjusted in conjunction with these non-standard measures. We find that the effects are larger when the separation principle is breached, that is to say when we force monetary policy not to react to the stimulative effects of LTROs. In this paper, we assess the macroeconomic impact of LTROs in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model à la Smets and Wouters (2007), augmented with a frictional banking sector. In doing so, the paper makes two contributions. First, we extend the discount window setup developed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, section 3) to allow for maturities longer than just one quarter. Importantly, we find that lengthening the maturity of LTROs helps relax the bankers incentive constraint above and beyond the direct effect of short-term liquidity injections. Second, we estimate the model on pre-crisis data via Bayesian techniques, using macroeconomic and financial variables. Armed with the posterior distributions of the model's structural parameters, we assess quantitatively the macroeconomic effects of LTROs by allowing the central bank in our model to open alternative longer-term refinancing facilities.
NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In response to the 2008-2009 crisis, central banks in most advanced countries embarked in large-scale asset purchase programs. In the euro area, in which the financing of investment relies predominantly on the banking system, such programs played only a minor role. Instead, the bulk of non-standard interventions took the form of long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), with maturities of three, six, and finally twelve months in July 2009. Through these operations, the ECB aimed at increasing the average maturity of outstanding liquidity, from approximately 20 days before the crisis to more than 200 days in the second half of 2009. This policy was addressing funding concerns in the banking sector, in an attempt to allow banks to keep lending in spite of an acute confidence crisis. While LTROs were crucial to combat the crisis in the euro area, they have not received much attention in the literature.
In this paper, we assess the macroeconomic impact of LTROs in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model à la Smets and Wouters (2007), augmented with a frictional banking sector. In doing so, the paper makes two contributions. First, we extend the discount window setup developed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, section 3) to allow for maturities longer than just one quarter. Importantly, we find that lengthening the maturity of LTROs helps relax the bankers incentive constraint above and beyond the direct effect of short-term liquidity injections. Second, we estimate the model on pre-crisis data via Bayesian techniques, using macroeconomic and financial variables. Armed with the posterior distributions of the model's structural parameters, we assess quantitatively the macroeconomic effects of LTROs by allowing the central bank in our model to open alternative longer-term refinancing facilities.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that bankers face an incentive constraint stemming from their ability to divert assets financed via households deposits. As a consequence, in equilibrium, bankers charge a higher interest rate on loans than the interest rate they pay on deposits. This credit spread turns out to be counter-cyclical, thus proving an important amplification and propagation device. This mechanism accords well with standard descriptions of the bank lending channel and rationalizes how disruptions in the latter can threaten the proper transmission of monetary policy in times of crisis. In this context, an injection of central bank liquidity has the power of alleviating the aggregate effects of the bankers incentive constraint. However, the details of how standard monetary policy is conducted in conjunction with LTROs turn out to be crucial. Our baseline estimate is obtained under the separation principle. According to the latter, standard monetary policy actions are conducted irrespective of LTROs. In our DSGE model, we interpret the separation principle as follows: Insofar as the LTROs are expansionary, the separation principle has it that the nominal interest rate should be raised, to the extent warranted by the monetary policy reaction function. Alternatively, we consider liquidity injections when the separation principle is breached as long as the LTRO facility is in place. This is achieved by forcing the systematic component of monetary policy not to react to the stimulative effects of LTROs, while reacting normally to all the other structural shocks.
To assess the impact of the maturity lengthening of LTROs per se, we first consider the case of purely exogenous liquidity injections, with maturities of one, two, or four quarters. It turns out that LTROs are modestly expansionary, with longer maturities resulting in larger effects. In response to a four-quarter LTRO amounting to 2 percent of annual output, quarterly output increases by about 0.30 percent after three quarters. The multiplier after one year is only 0.12. Importantly, the separation principle calls for a counterbalancing increase in the nominal interest rate. The effects of a two-quarter exogenous LTRO are approximately half as small.
We find that breaching the separation principle magnifies substantially the macroeconomic effects of one-year LTROs. The mean response of quarterly output to a one-year LTRO of the same size as above is now an increase by about 1.2 percent after three quarters. The associated multiplier after one year amounts to slightly more than 0.5. Thus, combining LTROs with an accommodative conventional monetary policy results in much larger effects. This finding provides quantitative support to the statement by several Eurosystem officials that LTROs and standard monetary policy are complementary.
In a second set of simulations, we pay particular attention to an essential characteristic of the ECB's non conventional refinancing operations. Since the fourth quarter of 2008, all the refinancing operations of the ECB, including LTROs, have been conducted under the fixed rate full allotment (FRFA) tender procedure. Under the latter, the ECB sets the interest rate (fixed rate) and stands ready to offer whatever amount of liquidity demanded by the banking sector (full allotment).The key feature of the FRFA tender procedure is that, under the latter, the central bank balance sheet expansion is endogenous, mirroring the endogenous demand for central bank funds by financial intermediaries.
While our model is too crude to offer a detailed account of the demand for liquidity, we capture the endogeneity of the balance sheet expansion by postulating rule-based liquidity injections. Having this rule depend on the credit spread allows us to approximate (i) the demand for liquidity emanating from the banking sector and (ii) the policy intent of flooding the system with excess liquidity. We then feed in the model shocks triggering a 2008-like recession. In response, the central bank opens alternative rulebased LTRO facilities, with increasing maturities. We judge the efficacy of these facilities by comparing the resulting pathes of macroeconomic variables with those obtained absent LTROs.
Under the separation principle, we find that when a four-quarter LTRO facility is in place for three When the separation principle is breached, once again, we obtain larger effects. The multiplier on output is about 0.5 after one year. More importantly, the amount borrowed at the LTRO facility is now close to 2 percent of annual GDP, much smaller than under the separation principle. This confirms our finding of a complementarity between LTROs and more conventional monetary policy actions. to combat the crisis in the euro area, they have not received much attention in the literature.
In this paper, we assess the macroeconomic impact of LTROs in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model à la Smets and Wouters (2007), augmented with a frictional banking sector. In doing so, the paper makes two contributions. First, we extend the discount window setup developed by
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, section 3) to allow for maturities longer than just one quarter. Importantly, we find that lengthening the maturity of LTROs helps relax the bankers incentive constraint above and beyond the direct effect of short-term liquidity injections. Second, we estimate the model on pre-crisis data via Bayesian techniques, using macroeconomic and financial variables. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that bankers face an incentive constraint stemming from their ability to divert assets financed via households deposits. As a consequence, in equilibrium, bankers charge a higher interest rate on loans than the interest rate they pay on deposits. This credit spread turns out to be counter-cyclical, thus proving an important amplification and propagation device. This mechanism accords well with standard descriptions of the bank lending channel and rationalizes how disruptions in the latter can threaten the proper transmission of monetary policy in times of crisis. In this context, an injection of central bank liquidity has the power of alleviating the aggregate effects of the bankers incentive constraint. However, the details of how standard monetary policy is conducted in conjunction with LTROs turn out to be crucial. Our baseline estimate is obtained under the separation principle. According to the latter, standard monetary policy actions are conducted irrespective of LTROs. In our DSGE model, we interpret the separation principle as follows: Insofar as the LTROs are expansionary, the separation principle has it that the nominal interest rate should be raised, to the extent warranted by the monetary policy reaction function. Alternatively, we consider liquidity injections when the separation principle is breached as long as the LTRO facility is in place. This is achieved by forcing the systematic component of monetary policy not to react to the stimulative effects of LTROs, while reacting normally to all the other structural shocks. for more details about those programs and the other non conventional policies undertaken in the euro area. 2 As in previous studies, the focus on pre-crisis data is justified by our concern about a possible bias in estimation if we were to extend the sample to cover the crisis period.
We find that breaching the separation principle magnifies substantially the macroeconomic effects of one-year LTROs. The mean response of quarterly output to a one-year LTRO of the same size as above is now an increase by about 1.2 percent after three quarters. The associated multiplier after one year amounts to slightly more than 0. procedure. Under the latter, the ECB sets the interest rate (fixed rate) and stands ready to offer whatever amount of liquidity demanded by the banking sector (full allotment). 4 The key feature of the FRFA tender procedure is that, under the latter, the central bank balance sheet expansion is endogenous, mirroring the endogenous demand for central bank funds by financial intermediaries.
Under the separation principle, we find that when a four-quarter LTRO facility is in place for three When the separation principle is breached, once again, we obtain larger effects. The multiplier on output is about 0.5 after one year. More importantly, the amount borrowed at the LTRO facility is now close to 2 percent of annual GDP, much smaller than under the separation principle. This confirms our finding of a complementarity between LTROs and more conventional monetary policy actions.
As a caveat, we emphasize that this paper does not consider the case of the two three-year LTROs conducted in December 2012 and February 2013. These were implemented in the particular context of the European sovereign debt crisis. As a result of these liquidity injections, a number of banks in the euro area embarked in carry-trade operations, which resulted in a sharp decline in sovereign spreads.
Addressing this would require allowing for sovereign default risk in the model, an endeavor that we leave for future research. The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we expound the model and describe how we incorporate LTROs in this setup. In section 3, we describe our empirical approach and comment on the results, insisting on the posterior distribution of parameters pertaining to the frictional banking sector. We then report our estimate of macroeconomic effects LTROs. The last section briefly concludes.
THE DSGE MODEL
In this section we describe the structural model we will use in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
To begin with, we augment the frictional banking sector à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) to allow for In this sector, banks issue short-term debt (deposits), which they combine with their net worth to finance purchases of claims on physical capital issued by intermediate goods producers. For concreteness, consider banker j. At the end of t, he has deposits D t (j), net worth N t (j), and purchases k t (j) claims on capital at price P k,t . Banker j's balance sheet is accordingly
6 As argued by Woodford (2003) , this formulation of the production function helps insulate inflation from the real marginal cost, resulting in a lower degree of nominal price rigidities given an estimated slope for the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Letting R t denote the non-contingent interest rate payable on deposits and R k,t+1 the return on capital, banker j's net worth evolves according to
where we used (1) to eliminate D t (j).
Banker's j objective is then to maximize its franchise value, i.e. the expected and discounted value of funds she brings back to the household upon exit
where β s Λ t+s /Λ t is the nominal stochastic discount factor between dates t + s and t.
At the end of each period t (after deposits have been collected), we assume that bankers can divert a fraction α t of their asset side P k,t k t (j). If the banker decides to divert assets, depositors have the ability to force him into bankruptcy. However, it is prohibitively costly for them to recover the diverted assets.
Knowing this in advance, depositors are not willing to lend to bankers unless the franchise value of a banker is higher than the gain from asset diversion. Hence, banker j faces the incentive constraint
The fraction of divertible assets α t evolves over time according to
whereᾱ pins down the steady-state value of α and ϕ α,t is an exogenous shock. 7 We guess the form of banker j's value function
Here, γ k,t can be interpreted as the net (nominal) value of an extra unit of private assets while γ t is the net value of an extra unit of net worth. Assuming that condition (4) binds (as is the case in the steady state considered here), straightforward manipulations of (4) and (5) yield
where the endogenous leverage ratio φ t obeys
Plugging this back into (3), using (1) and (2), and differentiating term by term, we obtain
where we defined
2.3. Introducing LTROs. In this section, we introduce LTROs in the model. This is done by extending the discount window setup devised by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) to allow for maturities longer than just one quarter. Formally, we now assume that in a given period t 0 > 0, the Central Bank announces (credibly) that a new refinancing facility is available over the following T quarters. During this lapse of time, banks have access in each quarter to LTROs with a maturity of q > 0 quarters. The non-contingent interest rate payable in each quarter of the LTROs is R m,t and is a priori susceptible to changes. Starting from period t 0 + T, the facility is closed and there are no more funds borrowed from the central bank. Letting M t,t−i (j) denote the period t outstanding amount of ECB's liquidity borrowed from the LTRO facility at date t − i by banker j, it must be the case that
Also, since the LTROs have a q-quarter maturity, we have M t+i|t (j) = 0 for i ≥ q. So, in each quarter, banker j has total amount of liquidity M f ,t (j)
The balance sheet of banker j now rewrites
The net worth of bank j, while active, accumulates according to
As before, bankers have the ability to divert a fraction α t of their asset side, but this time this is net the fraction ς ∈ [0, 1] of funds M f ,t (j) borrowed from the Central Bank (for example because the loan has been extra collateralized). In our simulations, we will impose ς = 1. Thus, banker j faces the reformulated incentive constraint
We guess the new form of banker j's value function
where γ k,t and γ t are the same as before, and γ m,t can be interpreted as the net cost of an extra unit of LTRO and obeys
The optimal choice for M t|t (j) implies the arbitrage condition
Importantly, equations (12) and (13) tell us that financial intermediaries are willing to pay a premium to have access to the LTRO facility. This premium is the price for the ability to expand credit with a less stringent incentive constraint. The Central Bank should thus set R m,t so as to make financial intermediaries indifferent at the margin between LTROs and private credit.
Assuming that condition (10) binds (as is the case in the steady state considered here), straightforward manipulations of (10), (11), and (13) yield
where the endogenous leverage ratio φ t is still defined as above. This reformulation of the incentive constraint tells us that LTROs help banker j to extend more loans than otherwise permitted by the endogenous leverage ratio φ t .
To conclude, the LTRO facility helps relax the incentive constraint. This happens because in this setup, the Central Bank has two key advantages. First, as long as ς > 0, assets financed with funds borrowed from the Central Banks are less divertible than those financed via deposits. This mechanically renders the incentive constraint less stringent. Second, because it never defaults, the Central Bank itself is not balance-sheet constrained. Taking these two special advantages into account, the Central Bank can effectively take up an intermediation role in times of crisis by issuing short-term debt to households and lending those funds to financial intermediaries through an LTRO facility.
2.4. Aggregation. Let N t and M f ,t denote the aggregate counterparts of N t (j) and M f ,t (j), respectively, and let Ξ t denote the nominal start up funds that households transfer to new bankers. We assume that exiting bankers reimburse the outstanding amount of funds that they borrowed from the Central Bank.
The aggregate law of motion of net worth is thus
In the quantitative part of the paper, the real transfer from the households Ξ t /P t is assumed to be proportional to the beginning of period real net worth n t−1 , where ω is the proportionality coefficient and where P t denotes the aggregate price level. Similarly, the the aggregate incentive constraint rewrites
Finally, the Central Bank finances its liquidity facility by issuing short-term debt B st t , bought by the households. We assume that these assets are perfectly substitutable with deposits. Accordingly, the Central Bank's balance sheet is B st t = M f ,t . Finally, we assume that any profit the Central Bank makes through its liquidity facility is rebated to the government (in the form of dividends). These profits stem from the difference between the rate at which the Central Bank loans funds to banks (R m,t ) and the interest rate it pays on short-term debt (R t ).
As argued above, the LTRO facility helps relax the incentive constraint. Assuming a certain pattern for the liquidity injections, the following proposition states this more formally. Proposition 1. Suppose the central bank sets up a facility of q-quarter LTROs for T consecutive periods, starting from period t 0 . Let M t denote the aggregate amount of funds borrowed from the LTRO facility at date t and assume that M t =ψ t P k,t k t , withψ
where ψ t ∈ (0, 1) follows a process known to the agents. The aggregate incentive constraint is then
Maturity Lengthening Effect
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 1 shows that the liquidity injections has two effects on the aggregate incentive constraint.
The direct effect on the left-hand side shows that, given a level of aggregate net worth and a leverage ratio, having the LTRO facility in place helps banks extend more loans than they would have done absent the liquidity injections. Basically, the LTRO facility acts as a multiplier on the endogenous leverage ratio. This is similar to the effect documented by Gertler and Karadi (2011) in the case of asset purchase programs. The maturity lengthening effect stems from the funds inherited from past LTROs. They too contribute to a less stringent aggregate incentive constraint. These effects are all the more pronounced as he LTRO facility is in place. Yet, past LTROs continue to relax the incentive constraint even after the LTRO facility is closed. Indeed, since the last LTRO takes place at period t 0 + T − 1, by construction, it takes an extrauarters to drive M f ,t to zero. This second term accounts for the extra stimulative impact yielded by a maturity lengthening.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe how the above model is solved and estimated. We discuss our choice of priors and comment on the posterior distribution of the structural parameters related to the frictional banking sector. We then use the estimated model to assess the macroeconomic effects of a series of LTRO facilities.
3.1. Estimation. Using pre-crisis data, we estimate a version of the model without LTRO facilities. Before, taking the model to the data, we first induce stationarity by getting rid of the stochastic trend component z t and we log-linearize the resulting system in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. 8 In the process of inducing stationarity, it is convenient to define the following auxiliary parame-
The composite parameterω is simply a growth-adjusted version of the share of net worth redirected to new bankers ω. In contrast, ω k is a more sophisticated object linked to the steady-state value of the equilibrium spread between R k and R. It turns out to be more convenient to estimate ω k rather than the probability of surviving for bankers σ. This is so because by imposing a prior with positive support, we make sure that the incentive constraint binds in steady state. 8 See the technical appendix for further details on the procedure used to induce stationarity. 9 The steady-state multiplier on the incentive constraint is proportional to ω k . See the technical appendix for further details.
The vector of structural parameters ϑ is split in two sub-vectors ϑ 1 and ϑ 2 . The first one, ϑ 1 contains parameters calibrated prior to estimation. Typically, these are parameters difficult to estimate in our framework. They are described in appendix C. The remaining parameters are estimated. We follow the Bayesian approach to estimate the log-linearized model, as advocated by An and Schorfheide (2007).
After having cast the dynamic system in a state-space representation for the set of observable variables, we use the Kalman filter (i) to measure the likelihood of the observed variables and (ii) to form the posterior distribution of the structural parameters by combining the likelihood function with a joint density characterizing some prior beliefs. Given the specification of the model, the posterior distribution cannot be recovered analytically but may be computed numerically, using a Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling approach. More specifically, we rely on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain a random draw of size 1,000,000 from the posterior distribution of the parameters.
We estimate the model using eight series of euro area quarterly data: GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth, the growth rate of real hourly compensation, the growth rate of hours worked, the inflation rate, measured as the growth rate of the GDP deflator, the short-term nominal interest rate, measured as the three-month Euribor rate, and a measure of non-financial corporate spreads for We impose a prior mean of 0.5 for α, implying that bankers have the ability to divert a large fraction of funds borrowed from the households. However, the standard error for the prior distribution is 0.1, thus allowing for a rich set of values for α. The growth-adjusted share of aggregate net worth redirected to new bankers is comprised between 0 and 1 and should be small if one follows Gertler and Karadi (2011).
To impose this, we select a Beta prior for 100ω, with mean 0.2 and standard error 0.1. The composite parameter ω k is expected to be small, since it is defined as the difference between two quantities close to but below 1. However, ω k must be greater than zero for the equilibrium around which the model is log-linearized to be well defined. We thus impose a Gamma distribution for 100ω k , with a prior mean of Note: 'low' and 'high' denote the bounds of the 90% probability interval for the posterior distribution.
3.1.2. Posterior Distributions. The last four columns of Table 1 report information on the posterior distribution of parameters related to the banking sector and financial shocks: the mean, the standard deviation, and the bounds of the associated 90 percent confidence region. The rest of the parameters are discussed in Appendix D.
The first result that stands out is the relatively high bankers' ability to divert funds. The posterior mean for α is 0.48 with a posterior 90 percent interval (0.35,0.60). The data thus seem to favor a substantial level of asset diversion to match the spread over the risk-free rate.
Another key parameter of interest is the growth-adjusted fraction of net worth directed to new bankers.
The posterior mean for this parameter is small and estimated to 0.23 percent. Notice however that the posterior distribution is hardly different from the prior, suggesting that aggregate data are close to silent on this parameter. This can be seen from the fact that the posterior mean and the posterior standard deviation for this parameter do not differ much from their prior counterpart.
Finally, the third parameter related to the banking sector is the composite parameter ω k , directly linked to the bankers' survival probability, σ. With a mean for 100ω k estimated to 1.27 (with associated 90 percent confidence interval (0.55,1.99)), the implied probability of survival for bankers is 0.9867, a value close to that used in Gertler and Karadi (2011). This implies a life expectancy close to 19 years for bankers.
Finally, the asset diversion shock ϕ α and the capital quality shock ϕ k , exhibit some persistence with autoregressive parameters and associated 90 percent confidence bands ρ α = 0.70 (0.49,0.93) and ρ k = 0.70 (0.50,0.90). However, their standard deviations, σ α = 0.19 and σ k = 0.16, are more than four times as small as the standard deviation of productivity shocks (σ z = 0.75).
Quantifying the Macroeconomic Effects of LTROs. We now quantify the macroeconomic effects of
LTROs. We begin with exogenous liquidity injections. This allows us to control for the size of the LTRO and thus assess the effects of the maturity lenghtening per se. We then consider endogenous LTROs calibrated to replicate the actual size of their 2009 actual counterparts.
3.2.1. Exogenous Liquidity Injections. To assess the impact of the maturity lengthening of LTROs per se, we first consider the case of purely exogenous liquidity injections, with increasing maturities. This approach enables us to control for the size of the liquidity injection. Formally, we set the liquidity injection at date t = 0 equal to ψ 0 P k,0 k 0 . We set ψ 0 so that the total amount borrowed at the different LTROs considered corresponds to 2 percent of annual GDP. This is approximately the net amount borrowed at the series of three-month and six-month LTROs launched in October 2008. We consider one-time exogenous liquidity injections with maturities of one, two, and four quarters, even though only three-month and six-month LTROs actually took place at the end of 2008. In turn, the central bank sets R m,t according to (12) . The effects of these shocks depend on how the central bank adapts its standard monetary policy to accompany the liquidity injection. To investigate this, we also consider two alternative scenarios.
Our baseline scenario is that these liquidity injections take place under the separation principle. According to the latter, liquidity support policies (i) can be and are conducted irrespective of standard The increase in output is essentially driven by an increase in investment. In effect, consumption hardly reacts over the initial LTRO phase. This is so because the separation principle dictates a series of increases in the short-term nominal interest rate, triggered by the gradual rise in inflation and output. Due to the Taylor principle, the real interest rate is set on an increasing path over the LTRO horizon, which in turn mutes the response of consumption.
In contrast, the peak response of investment is more than twice as large as that of output. In turn, the increase in investment is rendered possible by a less stringent incentive constraint. The inflow of fresh funds into the banking sector enables financial intermediaries to extend more loans. However, as the dynamics of capital suggest, this process is very gradual. This in turn bids up the price of capital. The increase in the price of capital strengthens the aggregate net worth of the banking sector. This can be seen from the dynamics of the leverage ratio φ t , which declines by approximately 5 percent on impact.
Notice that this decline is all the more protracted as the LTRO maturity is long. When the operation expires, the price of capital declines. This corresponds to the moment when the banking sector has to reimburse the funds borrowed from the central bank. At this time, banks start to reduce the scale of their operations, thus triggering a drop in the real price of capital. In turn, after the LTRO expiry, the leverage ratio sharply increases. It then gradually returns to its steady-state value from above. Notice however that there is a fair amount of uncertainty surrounding the mean responses of investment, the price of capital, and the leverage ratio.
Importantly, the inflationary effects of the LTRO shock are somewhat limited. In the two-quarter LTRO, year-on-year inflation gradually rises by slightly more than 2 basis points above target after two quarters and then declines. In the four-quarter LTRO, inflation increases by slightly less than 8 basis points. Thus, despite a massive injection of funds in the banking sector, inflation developments remain relatively subdued.
To sum up, an exogenous LTRO successfully reduces the leverage ratio, as initially targeted by the ECB. Nevertheless, it has a very limited effect on output or inflation. As the maturity of the operation lengthens, the effects are bigger. However, even with a four-quarter maturity, the effects of an exogenous LTRO remain quite small.
The central bank's decision to increase the short-term interest rate while injecting funds in the banking sector seems remotely linked to what the ECB did in practice. As a matter of fact, the ECB accompanied its liquidity injections at the end of 2008 with a series of interest rate cuts. In our second scenario, we force the central bank to breach the separation principle. In doing so, we have to take a stand on how the ECB could do this in practice.
We assume that the central bank now adapts its monetary policy by neutralizing the endogenous response of the short-term nominal interest rate for as many periods as the maturity of the LTRO. We further assume that this policy move is announced at the same time as the LTRO shocks. While inconsistent with the ECB's reluctance to announce an interest rate path, we still view this exercise as providing a useful illustration of the ECB's policy. In practice, the truth probably lies in between our two alternative scenarios (separation principle versus a breach of the latter). The ECB did not announce that it would keep interest rates unchanged over the LTRO horizon. At the same time, the private sector was not expecting any interest rate hike over this horizon, viewing such hikes as inconsistent with the policy intention. Thus, our experiments are best viewed as providing a lower and an upper bounds of the LTRO policy.
To operationalize this alternative scenario, we append q shocks i R,t−i for i = 0, . . . , q − 1 to the monetary policy rule, thus allowing for the possibility of pre-announcing deviations from the standard monetary policy over the life of the q-quarter LTRO. In our alternative scenario, the LTRO shock is thus accompanied by the surprise announcement at date t = 0 of q shocks to the 0 R,0 , . . . , q−1 R,0 . We compute these shocks so as to neutralize the systematic part of the Taylor rule, resulting in a nominal rate stuck at its steady-state value for the firstuarters of the simulation. Second, the initial surprise cut in R t reduces the expected required return on capital. This triggers a larger inflow of investment projects, with a stronger response of capital, particularly apparent in the case of four-quarter LTROs. In turn, through a form of credit channel accelerator, the increase in the real price of capital and the associated decline in the leverage ratio call for a further increase in investment.
Importantly, the leverage ratio now converges back to its steady-state value from below. All in all, this translates into a higher and more persistent boom in output. In particular, the mean peak response of output is now close to 1.2 percent with a the four-quarter LTRO. Notice finally that the uncertainty surrounding these responses is larger than in the benchmark scenario. Yet, the mean responses obtained when the separation principle holds are almost always outside these probability bands. This is particularly evident in the case of four-quarter LTROs.
To sum up, breaching the separation principle magnifies the effects of the exogenous liquidity injection. This magnification effect is all the pronounced as the LTRO maturity is long. That being said, we still find a small macroeconomic effect for two-quarter LTROs. The multiplier associated with a twoquarter LTRO is about 0.075, as opposed to 0.530 for a four-quarter LTRO.
Based on this, one could be tempted to argue that the ECB did not react appropriately to the [2008] [2009] crisis by adopting unconventional measures with muted effects. We claim below that such a negative assessment is not warranted for two reasons. First, the LTROs implemented at the end of 2008 were not one-time liquidity injections but rather took the form of a facility set to stay in place for almost three quarters, with a preset calendar known to market participants. Second, the mode in which liquidity was allotted at that time does not resemble exogenous injections but rather reflected the endogenous demand 10 Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2012) use a similar method to simulate forward guidance shocks. Here, we do not consider any serial correlation in the deviation from the plain Taylor rule once the central banks decides to re-adhere strictly to its policy rule afteruarters. This allows us to consider policy shocks the effects of which immediately vanish when the central bank decides to revert back to its normal policy rule. 
FIGURE 2. Exogenous LTROs -No Separation Principle
Note: The grey area is the 68 percent confidence region. The plain line is the mean response; the dashed line is the mean response under the separation principle. Output, investment, consumption, the price of capital, capital, and the leverage ratio are in percent deviation from steady state. LTRO are reported in percent relative to annual output. The year-on-year inflation rate and the annualized short-term interest rate are in deviation from steady state.
for liquidity emanating from the banking sector. In the following simulations, we address explicitly these characteristics. The key feature of the FRFA tender procedure is that, under the latter, the central bank balance sheet expansion is endogenous, mirroring the endogenous demand for central bank funds by financial intermediaries. While our model is too crude to offer a detailed account of the demand for liquidity, we capture the endogeneity of the balance sheet expansion by postulating rule-based liquidity injections.
Endogenous Liquidity Injections. As the first act of its Enhanced Credit
Having this rule depend on the credit spread Spr t ≡ E t {R k,t+1 − R t } allows us to approximate (i) the demand for liquidity emanating from the banking sector and (ii) the policy intent of flooding the system with excess liquidity. Formally, we now assume that, for the number T of periods in which the LTRO facility is in place, M t = ψ t P k,t k t with
where ψ > 0 and Spr is the steady-state value of Spr t . The max operator is included to make sure that whenever the credit spread is lower than its steady-state value, banks cannot borrow negative amounts to the central bank. We calibrate ψ so that the amount borrowed at the two-quarter LTRO facility is 2 .7, h = 1.9, k = −3.7, i = 1.7, p = −1.3, g = 2.1, α = 1.9, R = 1.9, and z = −2.1.
There are two striking findings. First, the trough reached in the fourth quarter of 2008 seems essentially driven by large negative shocks to c and k . However, the crisis is also the result of a sudden tightening of the incentive constraint, via a shock to α , and a negative shock to technology z . Finally, to a lesser extent, the crisis also originates from a large contractionary without an LTRO facility. We interpret the resulting path as the impulse response to an LTRO shock.
We also assess the uncertainty surrounding the counterfactual response by drawing in the posterior distribution of the structural parameters and repeating the exercise described above for each draw, thus yielding a posterior distribution for our counterfactual impulse response functions.
An important caveat in this analysis is that three-month and six-month LTROs actually took place in the fourth quarter of 2008, as discussed above. Given the discrete nature of these policy actions, it is difficult to take them into account in our smoothing exercise. Here, we deliberately ignore this problem, so that the shocks that we back out in the fourth quarter of 2008 are probably smaller than the shocks that actually hit the economy at this time, insofar as three-month and six-month LTROs were effective at mitigating the effects of the crisis. We argued before that, for three-month LTROs, this need not be a major problem for our analysis given that they hardly affect the dynamics of aggregate variables.
However, we do find below that six-month LTROs have a non trivial impact on aggregate dynamics.
Strictly speaking, thus, the exercise undertaken below should not be interpreted as a counterfactual analysis but rather as an analysis of the likely effects of an LTRO shock under economic circumstances resembling those that affected the euro area in the last quarter of 2008.
As before, we start by assessing the macroeconomic effects of the two-quarter and four-quarter LTRO The LTRO is accompanied by a large amount of funds borrowed from the central bank. By construction, the mean response on impact is about 2 percent of annual output for the two-quarter LTRO facility, close to the actual amount borrowed at the end of 2008. With the four-quarter LTRO facility, the amount borrowed is larger, culminating at more than 4 percent of annual GDP after three quarters. The shock also triggers hump-shaped responses of output, investment, consumption, capital, year-on-year inflation, and the annualized nominal short-term interest rate. In the two-quarter LTRO facility, the peak response of output is close to 0.3 percent, while it is higher than 0.7 percent with the four-quarter LTRO facility. Not surprisingly, having an LTRO facility in place is a more powerful tool than implementing one-time exogenous liquidity injections. Yet, if we define the multiplier as the cumulated deviation of output divided by the overall amount of liquidity borrowed, we obtain 0.063 for the two-quarter LTRO and 0.124 for the four-quarter LTRO after one year. These are figures close to what obtained with the exogenous LTROs. Once again, judged through this metric, the effects of the LTRO are modest.
As before, the separation principle is partly responsible for these relatively modest effects. In the twoquarter LTRO facility, the peak response of the annualized interest rate is about 25 basis points, while it is close to 50 basis points with the four-quarter LTRO facility. Importantly, the inflationary effects of the LTRO shock are somewhat limited. With the two-quarter LTRO facility, year-on-year inflation gradually rises by less than 10 basis points above target after four quarters and then declines. With the four-quarter LTRO facility, it gradually rises by approximately 20 basis points above target after five quarters and then declines. Thus, despite a massive injection of funds in the banking sector, inflation developments remain once again relatively subdued.
Using the same motivation as before, we now redo the previous simulations assuming that the separation principle is breached. In the context of these simulations, there is an additional rationale for abandoning the separation principle. Since under the FRFA tender procedure the banking system is in a regime of excess liquidity, the three-month EURIBOR is driven to the floor of the channel system. Insofar as LTROs participate to maintain this regime of excess liquidity, one should expect that they contribute to exerting a downward pressure on the money market rates.
In practice, breaching the separation principle under endogenous LTROs is slightly more subtle than with exogenous liquidity injections. Under the latter, it was enough to unplug the Taylor-like rule during theuarters of the LTRO. Now, we want to make sure that the Taylor rule reacts normally to the shocks hitting the economy and yet does not react to the LTROs. To this end, we consider two economies subject to the same shocks as before: In the first economy, there are no LTROs; in the second one, we consider alternatively two-quarter and four-quarter LTROs. In addition, we force the standard monetary policy in the second economy to equal that of the first economy over a pre-specified horizon. In the case of either two-quarter or four-quarter LTROs, this happens for 4 consecutive quarters, corresponding to the number of periods before liquidity starts to resorb. Thus, in the second economy, we make sure that the systematic component of the Taylor-like rule does not react to that portion of the dynamics of output and inflation triggered by the LTRO facilities. Importantly, this restriction is imposed ex ante, so that agents in the model economy are aware of it and form expectations by taking it into account.
The outcome of our alternative scenario is reported on Figures 4(A) and 4(B). As before, the figure reports the mean response obtained by drawing 1000 times from the posterior distribution of ϑ 2 . This corresponds to the red line. The grey area is the 68 percent confidence band. For ease of comparison, the figure also reports the mean response obtained under the baseline scenario (dashed red line). Once again, we do not report the responses to a one-quarter LTRO, since the latter is just a muted version of the two-quarter LTRO.
The first striking result is that the amount of funds borrowed at the LTRO facility is now smaller. For the two-quarter LTRO facility, the maximal outstanding amount borrowed is slightly below 2 percent of annual GDP. With the four-quarter LTRO, it is close to 2 percent instead of 4 percent under the separation principle. This confirms our previous finding of a form of complementarity between standard monetary 
FIGURE 4. Endogenous LTROs -No Separation Principle
policy and the non-standard refinancing facility: With the nominal interest rate unresponsive to the stimulus provided by LTROs, the latter can have much larger effects with substantially smaller amounts.
The second striking result pertains to the dynamics of the nominal interest rate. In the case of exogenous LTROs when the separation principle was breached, we found that the peak response of nominal interest rate after the LTRO expired was higher than that obtained under the separation principle. With endogenous LTROs, this difference is much less marked. In particular, with four-quarter LTROs, the nominal interest rate raises by a higher amount under the separation principle than when the latter is breached.
Overall, the multipliers are about 0.27 and 0.56 for the two-quarter and the four-quarter LTRO facili- increases by a modest 0.1 percent, then declines, and then increases again before converging back to its steady-state level from above. This mirrors the dynamics of the interest rate itself which first declines due to the shock and then increases as the shock resorbs and the systematic part of policy comes into play. Far after the initial shock (beyond the reported simulation horizon), the interest rate converges back to it from below, which governs the consumption pick-up. Finally, year-on-year inflation increases by slightly less than 25 basis points.
The dynamics triggered by an exogenous interest rate cut share resemblance with those originating from an LTRO shock. Overall, the relatively large interest rate cut considered here generates aggregate effects on output, consumption, and investment that are slightly smaller than those of an endogenous two-quarter LTRO facility set to stay in place for three quarters, without the separation principle. Thus, even though the ECB did not cut its policy rate to the same extent the Fed did after the crisis, and even stood above the Taylor prescription, our results suggest that its policy actions were in fact accommodative and stimulative.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, our objective was to assess quantitatively the macroeconomic effects of LTROs. To this end, we first formulated and estimated a DSGE model featuring a frictional banking sector à la Gertler and Karadi (2011). We then augmented this setup to allow for LTROs. To this end, we extended the the model to allow for refinancing operations with maturities longer than just one quarter. In this augmented setup, we found that lengthening the maturity of LTROs helps relax the bankers incentive constraint above and beyond the direct discount window effect documented by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
Our quantitative results confirmed this, under particular conditions. We found that liquidity injections that replicate the actual LTROs undertaken by the ECB after the crisis, can have large macroeconomic effects. However, the latter depend in an important way on how standard monetary policy is adjusted in conjunction with the non-standard measures. If the separation principle holds, that is if standard monetary policy reacts to the stimulative effects of LTROs, the nominal interest rate hikes tend to mute the benefits of LTROs. In contrast, when we force the systematic component of monetary policy not to react to LTROs, the effects are significantly larger.
We also showed that a two-quarter LTRO facility set to stay in place for three quarters, without the separation principle, has effects slightly larger than a shock to monetary policy resulting in a 50 basis points decline in the nominal interest rate. Thus, in the face of economic circumstances resembling 
where c t is private consumption. The flow of consumption services is subject to habit formation, with degree η ∈ [0, 1). Each member experiences disutility from work h t (i). Labor disutility is described by two parameters: χ > 0 is a scale parameter and ζ ≥ 0 governs the elasticity of labor supply. The overall impact on the representative household is simply the sum of individual disutilities. Finally, ϕ c,t and ϕ h,t are preference shocks.
The representative household maximizes (14) subject to the sequence of budget constraints
where P t is the aggregate price level, W t (i) is the nominal wage rate paid to labor of type i, and D t denotes deposits, paying the gross nominal interest rate R t . The representative household also receives nominal transfers T t (pays lumps sum taxes if negative) from the government. Finally Div t denotes aggregate nominal profits redistributed by monopolistic firms, capital producers, and bankers (net of startup funds) to the households.
A.2. Wage Setting. Unions sell specialized labor units to competitive labor intermediaries. In turn, these intermediaries combine the differentiated labor inputs into an aggregate labor index h t . This is done through the technology
, where θ w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types. Labor intermediaries take {W t (i), i ∈ [0, 1]} as given. Let W t denote the nominal wage paid to aggregate labor, which is defined as
.
Within each household, workers of type i ∈ [0, 1 − f ] are represented by a continuum [0, 1 − f ] of unions, each specialized in a specific labor type. The union does not care about the worker history (i.e., it does not care whether the worker it represents was a worker or a banker last period). It simply sets the wage rate paid to labor.
Each labor union sets wages on a staggered basis, taking as given the demand for their specific labor input. It is assumed that at each point in time only a fraction 1 − ξ w of the labor unions can set a new wage, which will remain fixed until the next time period the union is drawn to reset its wage. The remaining unions simply revise their wages according to the rule
where ι w ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inflation measure, π t ≡ P t /P t−1 − 1 is the inflation rate, and π is the inflation target set by the central bank. Also, when wages are not re-optimized, they are indexed to an average of steady-state total factor productivity (TFP)
growth, e γ z , and to last period's realized TFP growth, e γ z +ϕ z,t . It is useful to define
Let us now turn to the wage setting decision and define h t,t+s (i) the supply of hours at t + s by union i if it last re-optimized its wage at t. In period t, if drawn to re-optimize, union i chooses his wage rate
where Λ t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household's nominal budget constraint.
A.3. Intermediate Goods and Capital Producers. At the end of period t − 1, a unit-mass continuum of intermediate goods firms finance capital purchases to be used in the next period by issuing k t−1 claims at price P k,t−1 . At the beginning of period t the quality of capital is revealed to the firms through the realization of a shock ϕ k,t , so that efficient capital isk t =e ϕ k,t k t−1 . In period t, these firms have access to the constant-return technology
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of production with respect to efficient capital (and will turn out to be the capital share in output in the steady-state equilibrium), h t is the input of aggregate labor,k t is the input of efficient capital (i.e., capital after the capital quality has been revealed), and υ t is the capital utilization rate, entailing a cost a(υ t )k t (measured in final good units). For the purpose of estimation, it is useful to defineν a ≡ a (1)/a (1) and ν a ≡ν a /(1 +ν a ), which proves more convenient to estimate thanν a . The permanent TFP shock z t is assumed to evolve according to the process z t = γ z + z t−1 + ϕ z,t , where ϕ z,t is an exogenous shock to the growth of z t .
Let P m,t denote the nominal price of intermediate goods. The per unit cash flow accruing to effective capitalk t is
In equilibrium, the return on capital obeys
This return is entirely rebated to banks to pay for the date t − 1 loan. Capital is produced by a continuum of perfectly competitive capital producers. These producers buy backk t units of old efficient capital units, add new capital units using the input of final output (subject to adjustment costs) and sell the new capital to firms at the price P k,t . Given that households own capital producers, the objective of a capital producer is to choose a contingent plan for investment i t so as to where S(·) is an adjustment cost function such that S(e γ z ) = S (e γ z ) = 0 and S (e γ z )e 2γ z = ν i , and ϕ i,t is a shock to the investment technology. Notice that the first order condition onk t implies that any value ofk t is consistent with profit maximization. It follows thatk t is pinned down by the equilibrium on the market for used capital, yielding
A.4. Price Setting. There is a unique aggregate good, q t , which can be used either for consumption and investment purposes, y t , or used as an input in production, x t . Thus, q t = y t + x t . The aggregate good is produced by competitive firms according to the constant elasticity of substitution technology
, where q t (i) is the input of retail good i, with i ∈ [0, 1] and θ p,t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between any two retail goods. The aggregate nominal price is defined as
, where P t (i) is the nominal price of retail good i. Finally, the resource constraint is
where g t denotes government consumption (to be described below).
Each retail good i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolistic firm with the same index. Firm i has the technology
where y m,t (i) is the input of the intermediate good, x t (i) is the input of material good, and κe z t is a fixed production cost. In this specification, material goods and intermediate goods are complements. The share of material goods in production is s x ∈ [0, 1). This formulation of the production function has been advocated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) . 11 The assumption that the fixed cost grows at the same rate as exogenous technical progress z t ensures existence of a well-defined deterministic balanced growth path. In addition, we assume that the fixed cost κ is such that aggregate monopolistic profits are zero in the deterministic steady state.
11 See also Basu (1995).
We assume that in each period of time, a monopolistic firm can re-optimize its price with probability 1 − ξ p , irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its price. If the firm cannot re-optimize its price, the latter is re-scaled according to the simple revision rule
where ι p ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inflation measure π t . Again, it is useful to define
Let q t,t+s (i) denote the production of firm i at t + s if it last revised its price in period t. Let P t (i) denote the price which was chosen at t. According to the demand function for intermediate goods, 
Thus, if drawn to re-optimize in period t, firm i selects P t (i) so as to maximize the present discounted sum of profit streams
subject to (17), where S t = (1 − s x )P m,t + s x P t is the nominal marginal cost. We can then define the desired markup µ p,t as
where ϕ p,t is a price markup shock.
A.5. Government Policy and Shocks. The Central Bank sets R t according to the Taylor-like rulê
, γ y,t = log(y t /y t−4 ), and a letter without subscript refers to the steady-state value of the associated variable. Here, monetary policy reacts to (i) the year-on-year growth rate of the aggregate price level P t , in deviation from its target level π a , with responsiveness a π , and (ii) the year-on-year growth rate of output, in deviation from its average level, with responsiveness a y . Notice that, since R t is a quarterly rate, we include the term 1/4 in the systematic part of the rule for consistency. The monetary policy rule also features inertia, with degree ρ. Finally, monetary policy is perturbed by a stochastic shock ϕ R,t which accounts for policy errors and exogenous variations in the liquidity situation of the economy.
Government expenditures g t are assumed to be exogenous and evolve according to g t y t = s g e ϕ g,t ,
where s g is the steady-state share of government expenditures and ϕ g,t is an exogenous process. Now, recall that we assumed that M t =ψ t P k,t k t .
The aggregate incentive constraint thus rewrites
APPENDIX C. CALIBRATION
In this section, we describe the parameters calibrated prior to estimation. They are collected in the vector ϑ 1 = (β, δ, θ, γ z , s g , π, θ p , θ w , , s x , A), The subjective discount factor, β, is set to 0.9986, yielding an annual nominal interest rate of 4 percent. The depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.025. We set θ = 0.30, so that the labor income share in output is 70 percent. This is consistent with estimates for the euro area reported Table 2 Table 3 reports a complete summary of our estimation results. All the ρ x for x ∈ {c, h, α, z, k, i, R, g} have prior means 0.8, except ρ z for which the prior mean is 0.3, reflecting our prior of a much lower degree of serial correlation for the growth rate of permanent technology shocks. All these priors have 12 See Eurostat's website, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/esa95_supply_use_input_tables. 13 The parameter χ does not appear in the log-linear system, so that we do not need to calibrate it. a standard errors of 0.15, except ρ z for which the standard deviation of the prior is set to 0.10. Most of the σ x for x ∈ {c, h, α, z, k, i, R, g} have prior means 0.25 percent, except σ g , σ i , and σ z which have prior means equal to 1 percent. All these priors have a standard deviation of 2.
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ has a prior mean equal to 2, as is now standard, following the work by Smets and Wouters (2007). The standard error of the prior distribution is 0.5, allowing for a wide range of values. The growth-adjusted degree of habitη ≡ ηe −γ z has a prior mean of 0.75, with standard error equal to 0.1. Consistent with previous results, the prior mean for ν i is equal to 4, a large value. The associated standard error is 1. The prior mean for ν a is 0.5 (implying a unit value forν a ), with standard error 0.1.
The parameters pertaining to price and wage nominal rigidities share the same priors. The Calvo probabilities ξ p and ξ w have prior means equal to 0.75, with standard error 0.1, and the indexation parameters ι p and ι w have prior leans equal to 0.5, with standard error 0.2. The degree of responsiveness to inflation in the Taylor-like rule, a π , has prior mean equal to 2, with standard error equal to 0.3, while the degree of responsiveness to output growth has a much slower prior mean of 0.5, with standard error equal to 0.1.
We now discuss our posterior results. As regards the nominal rigidity parameters, the posterior means imply an average duration of price and wage adjustment in the euro area of about 9 months (ξ p = 0.66) and slightly more than 12 months (ξ w = 0.77), respectively. The means of the wage and price indexation parameters are ι w = 0.16 and ι p = 0.17, respectively. This is consistent with the now standard result that the euro area data do not require too high a degree of price or wage indexation to match the persistence in the data. The posterior moments for the monetary policy rule imply that the monetary authority reacts slightly more aggressively to inflation and output than the standard Taylor prescription (a π = 1.67 and a y = 0.73), and shows a modest degree of interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0.61).
Concerning household's preferences, the habit persistence parameter,η, is estimated at 0.55 at the posterior mean, with a 90 percent confidence interval (0.43,0.68). The posterior mean for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ζ, is 2.14 with a 90 percent confidence interval of (1.32,2.95). Again, these values are consistent with several contributions in the medium-scale DSGE literature. Notice however that the posterior distribution of ζ is almost identical to the prior, suggesting that our aggregate data are close to silent on this parameter too. Once again, this can be seen from the fact that the posterior mean and the posterior standard deviation for this parameter do not differ much from their prior counterpart.
Turning to real frictions in production, estimates for the curvatures of investment adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs are ν i = 3.31 and ν a = 0.29 at the posterior mean. In turn, the estimated value of ν a impliesν a = 0.41, yielding a small degree of curvature for the utilization cost function. Note: 'low' and 'high' denote the bounds of the 90% probability interval for the posterior distribution.
